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The limitations of working memory
(WM) and their determinants have been
a matter of intense debate in the last
years (e.g., Barrouillet and Camos, 2012;
Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2013; Ricker
et al., 2014; see Barrouillet and Camos,
2015, for a review). Is forgetting fromWM
only due to interference, or do WM traces
also suffer from temporal decay? This lat-
ter hypothesis has recently gained some
credence from the verification of the main
predictions of the time-based resource-
sharing model (TBRS, Barrouillet et al.,
2004), a theory that describes WM
functioning as the interplay between
the antagonistic processes of temporal
decay and restoration of memory traces.
However, Oberauer and Lewandowsky
(2014) have lately claimed that the predic-
tions that the authors of the TBRS model
drew from their theory do not follow from
its main tenets. In this rejoinder, we show
that Oberauer and Lewandowsky’s analy-
sis is wrong, revealing a misunderstanding
of the TBRS model.
THE TBRS MODEL AND ITS
PREDICTIONS
The TBRS model was initially developed
to account for performance in complex
span tasks involving the maintenance of
memory items (e.g., words or digits) while
performing an intervening activity (e.g.,
solving equations). Assuming that mem-
ory traces decay when attention is switched
away, but are refreshed when attention
is available anew, we predicted that WM
spans (i.e., the maximum number of items
that can be recalled) should be a function
of the proportion of time during which
the intervening activity occupies attention.
We called this proportion cognitive load
(CL, Barrouillet et al., 2004). To test this
hypothesis, we designed new computer-
paced WM tasks in which participants are
presented with series of memory items
for further recall (e.g., letters), each of
them being followed by a series of dis-
tracters successively displayed on screen
at a fixed pace (e.g., digits for a parity
judgment task). Figure 1 illustrates such a
task, black bars below each digit represent-
ing the duration of the attentional capture
involved by parity judgment. Let us call a
this duration, N the number of distracters
to be processed after each memory item,
and T the total time available to process
them (i.e., the time elapsed between two
successive memory items). Cognitive load
would thus correspond to
CL = aN/T (1)
We verified in several studies that WM
spans are a linear function of CL with
lower CL resulting in higher spans
(Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2007, 2011a;
Vergauwe et al., 2010; see Barrouillet
and Camos, 2012, 2015, for reviews). It
is worth noting that CL depends on the
pace at which distracters are processed,
but not on their number. This appears
when expressing T in Equation (1) as tN,
with t referring to the time allowed to
process each distracter (Figure 1).
CL = aN/tN = a/t (2)
It becomes clear that N can vary with-
out affecting CL. This is why the TBRS
model predicts that, provided that the dis-
tracters are presented at a constant pace,
their number has no effect on WM per-
formance because CL remains unchanged.
This prediction was verified in several
studies (Barrouillet et al., 2004, 2011b;
Plancher and Barrouillet, 2013). However,
Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2014) have
recently claimed that the TBRSmodel does
not warrant such a prediction, and that
the absence of effect of the number of
distracters rules our theory out.
OBERAUER AND LEWANDOWSKY’S
(2014) ANALYSIS OF THE TBRS MODEL
Oberauer and Lewandowsky assume that,
within the TBRS model, each distracter
operation i involves a certain loss of mem-
ory strength di by decay due to atten-
tional capture. This capture is followed
by a period of free time fti during which
memory traces can be refreshed resulting
in a gain in memory strength ri. They
conclude that the net loss from processing
a distracter i is thereforedi -ri. IfD is
the mean loss of memory strength through
decay across all distracter operations in the
interval between two memory items, and
R is the mean gain of memory strength
through refreshing, the net loss afterN dis-
tracters should equal N(D - R). Thus,
Oberauer and Lewandowsky assume “if,
at a given level of CL, D exceeds R,
then the net loss of memory strength nec-
essarily increases with N, which inevitably
leads to the prediction of more forget-
ting with increasing number of distracter
operations at a constant level of CL. Thus,
memory must be predicted to depend not
only on CL but also on a second variable,
N” (Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2014,
p. 17). Oberauer and Lewandowsky envi-
sion only one exception to this conclusion.
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the temporal parameters relevant for recall performance in a complex span task according to the TBRS model.
This is when R fully compensates D,
in which case processing distracters would
no longer impair memory at all compared
to a no-distracter control, something that
could only happen, in their view, for very
low levels of CL. However, for any higher
level of CL, they consider that D - R
must be larger than 0, implying that mem-
ory performance must be predicted to
decline with increasing N. In other words,
Oberauer and Lewandowsky claim that
the TBRS model predicts an effect of the
number of distracters, even at constant
CL. They consider their analysis as but-
tressed by the results of computational
simulations run with their TBRS∗ model
(Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2011) that
they present as a computational imple-
mentation of the TBRS model. TBRS∗
produced more forgetting with a greater
number of distracters, except for very low
CL levels.
Oberauer and Lewandowsky (2014) ran
two experiments using the same design as
we used in Barrouillet et al. (2011b), a
study in which we verified that the number
of distracters has no effect on recall perfor-
mance at constant CL, and they replicated
our findings. Based on their own analy-
sis of the TBRS model, they claimed that
the absence of effect of the number of dis-
tracters at constant CL would contradict it.
A REAPPRAISAL OF OBERAUER AND
LEWANDOWSKY’S (2004) ANALYSIS
Although Oberauer and Lewandowsky’s
analysis seems to reflect TBRS proposals,
it actually neglects the precise mechanisms
on which TBRS predictions are based. Let
us recall that these predictions concern
WM spans, that is the maximum number
of memory traces that can be maintained
in a state appropriate for their retrieval
while performing a given concurrent task.
The TBRS model predicts that this num-
ber should remain constant across varia-
tions of the number of distracting episodes
provided that CL remains constant. The
critical point here lies in the functional
differences between temporal decay and
refreshing. Whereas temporal decay is a
passive and parallel process that affects all
the storedmemory traces at the same time,
refreshing is an active and serial process
directed to one memory trace at a time
(McCabe, 2008; Barrouillet et al., 2011a).
Thus, whereas memory decay does not
depend on the number of memory traces
stored in WM, refreshing does. To antici-
pate, a given free time ft can be sufficient
for refreshing n memory items in such a
way that the R fully compensates the D
of each of these memory traces, but not
sufficient for refreshing n+ 1 items, result-
ing in a failure to recall the entire list and
in a WM span limited to n.
Let us call Si the strength of a given
memory trace that determines its accessi-
bility for refreshment or recall. Let us also
assume that there exists some minimum
strength level Sm below which a mem-
ory trace cannot be retrieved for refresh-
ing or recall and is consequently lost. For
sake of simplicity, suppose that, at the
beginning of a processing episode involv-
ing a decrementD, all thememory traces
stored in WM have the same strength S.
Their strength Se at the end of this episode
will be:
Se = S − D (3)
If these memory traces can be retrieved
after this processing episode, that is if Se ≥
Sm, WM span will be determined by the
maximum number of items that can ben-
efit for a refreshing ri that is sufficient to
permit them to survive the next process-
ing episodes and their associated decre-
ment D. This means that the value ri
for a given memory item must satisfy the
inequality
Se + ri − D ≥ Sm (4)
Basically, considering that Se ≥ Sm (if
this is not the case, the item can not
be retrieved and refreshed), the inequal-
ity will be verified each time ri equals
or exceeds D. However, this condition is
not necessarily satisfied for all the mem-
ory items to be maintained. If tr is the
time needed by the refreshing mechanism
to produce the requested ri on a single
memory trace, and ft the free time avail-
able for refreshing memory traces before
the next distracting episode, themaximum
number of items that can be sufficiently
refreshed to survive this next processing
episode is the integer n such as
n = [ft/tr] (5)
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Importantly, none of the parameters deter-
mining n depends on the number of
processing episodes. The time tr needed
to refresh a memory trace depends on
its strength level Se after the processing
episode (weaker traces necessitating longer
refreshing times), Se depending in turn on
the duration of the attentional capture a
involved by this processing episode (longer
attentional capture resulting in stronger
decay and lower Se values). The other
parameter in Equation (5), ft, represents
the free time after a processing episode
(see Figure 1). Thus, n depends only on
the two temporal parameters of the task,
a and ft, which are the sole determinants
of CL as expressed by Equation (2), know-
ing that t = a + ft. This can be easily
understood in the context of a complex
span task in which memory items are pre-
sented successively, the length of the lists
to bememorized being increased until fail-
ure to recall. As the number of items to be
maintained progressively increases, there
comes a point where it becomes impossi-
ble to sufficiently refresh all the memory
items in such a way that ri compen-
sates D for each of them. However, if
the free time ft allows to compensate the
decay D of n items, this equilibrium
can not be modified by adding other dis-
tracter episodes involving the same bal-
ance between a and ft.
This is of course true whatever the
level of CL, something that Oberauer and
Lewandowsky (2014) overlooked. They
write, “when an experiment contains mul-
tiple CL levels, and performance is found
to decline with increasing load, then the
equality R = D that is required for
the number of operations to have no effect
can only hold for the lowest CL, if at all.
At the larger CL levels, R < D must
be true, because otherwise the CL manip-
ulation would have no effect” (Oberauer
and Lewandowsky, 2014, p. 19). In other
words, Lewandowsky and Oberauer think
that a low CL is needed to have no effect of
the number of distracters, this effect nec-
essarily appearing at higher CL levels that
Lewandowsky and Oberauer attribute to
an increased difference between R and
D. This reasoning reveals a misunder-
standing of what CL is and what are the
determinants of its effect. Indeed, the CL
effect is not due to the fact that higher
levels of CL correspond to a greater differ-
ence betweenR andD. Thinking about
CL variations as resulting from variations
in this difference is misleading because,
whatever the CL level, ri necessarily
equals D for each of the recalled items,
otherwise they would be lost and forgotten
(see Equation 4). As we explained above,
CL effects result from the fact that the
number of memory items that can be suf-
ficiently restored after processing dimin-
ishes with the ratio between free time ft
and the duration a of the preceding atten-
tional capture. For evident reasons, this
ratio can not be modified by lengthen-
ing the series of distracters when they are
presented at an unchanged pace. This is
why the TBRS model predicts the absence
of effect of the number of distracters at
constant CL.
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